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Abstract 
Introduction
A heated debate on the most appropriate definition of genocide exists within the field of 
genocide studies. In books, journal articles, reviews and electronic sources scholars contest the 
relative merits of the United Nations definition versus alternative definitions, the importance of 
particular facets of the crime to understanding its fundamental nature, and which of the 
multitude of atrocities in the last century can truly be called genocide. This dialogue reflects the 
complex and difficult nature of the subject matter. Scholars examining genocide are attempting 
to comprehend the most heinous and extreme of crimes, and one that the perpetrators have often 
gone to great lengths to mask. An appropriate definition of genocide is a crucial tool through 
which to understand and interpret both specific instances of genocide and the phenomenon more 
generally. Yet no definition is without shortcomings or consequences. The definition of 
genocide has the power to influence how the history of genocide is written, and even which 
parts of that history are written. Furthermore, such discourse influences our response to 
contemporary issues surrounding genocide. This article will examine the strengths and 
weaknesses of various approaches to understanding genocide, and the impact of these 
approaches on the resulting scholarship.
Defining Genocide
The term 'genocide' was coined in 1944, by Polish Jewish scholar Raphaël Lemkin, who 
combined the Greek genos (race, tribe) with the Latin cide (killing) to describe the horror of the 
Jewish experience in Hitler's Germany. In 1946, it was largely as a result of Lemkin's 
determined lobbying that the issue of the prevention and punishment of genocide was first 
addressed at the United Nations. After discussion in the General Assembly, on 11 December 
1946 resolution 96-I was passed, declaring genocide to be a crime under international law, and 
requesting the Economic and Social Council of the UN to draw up a draft Convention. Lemkin's 
position as a consultant on the first draft of the Convention had considerable influence upon the 
proposed definition of 'genocide'. Many of his ideas, elucidated earlier in his seminal work Axis 
Rule in Occupied Europe, found strong expression in the draft. These included the concepts of 
cultural genocide as the destruction of the essential foundations of life of the group, biological 
genocide as the prevention of births within a group, and his focus upon racial and ethnic groups 
as those most in need of protection.[1] This draft was then submitted to the Economic and 
Social Council, where, in extensive debate, almost every point was contested. The final wording 
of the definition of 'genocide' and the provisions of the Convention were achieved through 
debate and compromise between the member states, which is strongly reflected in the document.
On 9 December 1948, the Convention on the Prevention and the Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide was adopted by the General Assembly. The crime of genocide was defined as:
"any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, 
ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group; 
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; 
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical 
destruction in whole or in part; 
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; 
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group". [2]
Genocide, conspiracy to commit genocide, direct and public incitement to commit genocide, 
attempt to commit genocide and complicity in genocide were all declared punishable. 
Contracting Parties, nations ratifying the Convention, acknowledged genocide as a crime under 
international law,"which they undertake to prevent and to punish".[3] The Convention came into 
effect in 1951, after being ratified by the minimum of twenty nations, and it remains in effect 
and unmodified.
The Genocide Convention has provided scholars examining genocide with an internationally 
recognised definition with which to engage. However, as a definition designed to enable 
international action to address the crime, it is essentially legal in nature. It quickly became 
apparent that it was ill-suited for historical scholarship. Nevertheless, many genocide scholars 
have chosen to work with the UN definition of genocide, despite its legal construction. Those 
who use this definition do not deny these shortcomings, but point to its stance as an 
internationally recognised definition of this odious crime. [4] This is the definition nations 
acknowledge when they ratify the Genocide Convention , and as such is of enormous 
significance. If nation states choose to address the problem of genocide at any level, they will 
almost certainly use the UN definition.
There are, however, distinct disadvantages to using this definition. Its narrowness has meant that 
a number of atrocities do not 'qualify' as genocide. In particular, political groups and social 
classes are not included under the Convention: political groups due to the opposition of Russia 
and the Eastern Bloc, and social classes due to the opposition of Western European 
democracies. Atrocities experienced by these groups must therefore be canvassed under titles 
such as 'Related Atrocities' or excluded from analysis altogether. And indeed, the definition is 
so narrow that in 1986 the Wall Street Journal was able to point out that no genocide since the 
Holocaust had yet 'qualified' under the UN criteria.[5] The requirement that genocidal acts must 
be "committed with intent" also poses great difficulties, as intent is very difficult to prove 
conclusively. [6]
A significant number of scholars investigating genocide have proposed and/or use an alternative 
definition to that provided by the UN. Alternative definitions have focused on one or a 
combination of elements that the author/s consider most fundamental to the nature of genocide. 
These have included the intent of the perpetrator, the type of acts that may be considered 
genocidal, the nature of the victim groups, and the role of the State as perpetrator. There are 
many such definitions in use. A good example is that formulated by Chalk and Jonassohn in The 
History and Sociology of Genocide. According to these authors, who focus primarily on 
perpetrator intent and the nature of the victim group, genocide is "A form of one-sided mass 
killing in which a state or other authority intends to destroy a group, as that group and 
membership in it are defined by the perpetrator".[7] Scholars like Chalk and Jonassohn defend 
their use of an alternative definition on the grounds that the shortcomings of the UN definition 
make it untenable for historical scholarship. The use of an alternative definition overcomes 
these difficulties, and allows the historian to define the phenomenon of genocide more clearly 
and accurately.
However, such an approach is not without its own disadvantages. A plethora of alternative 
definitions of genocide now exist. While many are complementary, there are important 
differences and even contradictions between them, further complicated by distinctions drawn by 
some scholars between concepts such as 'biological' and 'cultural' genocide. Furthermore, a 
number of scholars have attempted to clarify the topic with more detailed typologies of 
genocide, which have been even more variable.[8]
A third alternative has been to avoid the term altogether. Scholars have employed terms such as 
'democide', 'state-sponsored mass murder','ethnocide', 'ethnic cleansing' and 'politicide' to 
describe events otherwise referred to as genocide. Many of these terms have been utilised in 
situations where a label of genocide is contentious, for example in describing the persecution of 
a political group. While this is a valid option, it is one that only a minority of scholars have 
preferred. Those who have preferred this option must address many of the issues faced by 
scholars using an alternative definition of genocide, and are often left with a term that is not as 
readily understood.[9]
The result is a scholarship that has focused a great deal of energy on the issue of defining 
genocide. Arguably, this has limited the scope of the scholarship. What is certain, however, is 
the impact of a chosen definition on the resulting analysis. For scholars examining genocide, 
whether historians, sociologists, psychologists or anthropologists, the definition employed 
serves as the filter through which events are understood and interpreted. For example, a 
definition that only recognises particular acts as 'genocidal' may result in a history that focuses 
upon these events to the exclusion of others. In an area of investigation as complex as genocide 
studies, the definition of 'genocide' can be crucial to our understanding and analysis of events.
The choice of the most appropriate definition also has wider ramifications. As the British 
sociologist Anthony Giddens has argued,"theorising in social science is not about an 
environment which is indifferent to it, but one whose character is open to change in respect of 
that theorising".[10] That is, our understanding of past events can have contemporary 
consequences. In an area of study where those events are as extreme and as terrible as genocide, 
the scholar must be particularly mindful of such ramifications. For example, a determination of 
a past event as 'genocide' or otherwise may influence survivors' claims for compensation, or the 
efforts of the international community to punish perpetrators. Perhaps even more significantly, 
attempts to prevent future occurrences of genocide rest upon our current understanding of the 
crime. A definition of genocide that provides a broader understanding may lead to more 
effective preventative measures.
Such consequences of genocide scholarship must be given serious attention. Two case studies, 
an examination of the Killing Fields of Cambodia and the experiences of Indigenous Australians 
in the last two centuries, highlight these potential consequences, and just how significant they 
can be. The pivotal role of the definition of genocide in our understanding of these histories, and 
our contemporary response to them, is readily apparent.
Defining History: The Cambodian Genocide
On 17 April 1975 the Khmer Rouge gained control of Cambodia. Under Pol Pot, the Cambodian 
people were subjected to probably the most radical political, social and economic revolution 
ever. [11] The Cambodian people knew only of Angkar, the 'organisation', as the power behind 
the sudden transformation of their nation. Cities were evacuated, and the whole populace was 
forced to labour for Angkar , planting, tending and harvesting rice, constructing dams and 
irrigation channels, and clearing land for cultivation. There were no wages, and Angkar 
distributed food, usually inadequate quantities of rice. Schools and hospitals were closed, 
medical care became almost non-existent, the nation's currency and markets were abolished, and 
religion and cultural practices were suppressed.[12] Numerous groups were targeted for 
persecution, and often treated as 'enemies' to be eliminated. These included former urban 
dwellers, the Vietnamese and Chinese minorities, the Cham Muslim people, former 
government/military officials and the educated classes.[13] Between April 1976 and January 
1979, when the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia ended the genocide, an estimated 1.5 million 
Cambodians out of a population of 8 million died. Major causes of death included execution, 
starvation, exhaustion and lack of medical care.[14] 
Historians have been instrumental in the task of investigating the atrocities that occurred in 
Cambodia under the Pol Pot regime. The role of the definition of genocide in influencing this 
history has been significant. Historians using the UN definition of genocide have gone to great 
lengths to classify the atrocities of the Pol Pot regime between 1975 and 1979. The provisions 
of the UN definition, and its limitation of victim groups to "national, ethnic, racial or religious" 
have meant that not all victims of the Khmer Rouge can be considered victims of genocide.[15] 
However, researchers working in the period following the atrocities were able to gather 
evidence that several groups targeted by the Khmer Rouge did meet the criteria of the UN 
definition. These included minority Cham Muslims, Christians, Buddhist monks, and the 
Vietnamese and Chinese minorities. Arguably, Cambodians from the Khmer Rouge defined 
'Eastern Zone' of Cambodia may also be considered victims of genocide. Historians, most 
notably Ben Kiernan and Gregory Stanton, worked to gather evidence not only that these groups 
were particularly targeted by the Pol Pot regime, but also to prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
the genocidal intent of the Khmer Rouge.[16] Such history is invaluable. Beyond documenting 
the period, this history serves to publicly declare the Killing Fields of Cambodia as genocide, 
placing pressure on the UN and nations that have ratified the Genocide Convention to respond 
accordingly. Such careful determinations of genocide make it ever more difficult for 
governments concerned with political expediency to brush aside the atrocities.
However, there are other consequences of writing history using the UN definition of genocide, 
which must also be considered. The way we perceive the genocide in Cambodia is clearly 
influenced by the UN definition. As some victims of the atrocities are included as victims of 
genocide and others are excluded, does that imply that there is a qualitative difference in their 
experiences? Is it appropriate to accept, for example, that those victims of the atrocities targeted 
because they were from an educated class were subject to a different phenomenon from those 
targeted because they were Buddhist monks? Such questions are crucial to developing a fuller 
understanding of the genocide. Also important to consider in developing a comprehensive 
understanding of events are the perceptions of the Khmer Rouge perpetrators of the genocide. 
Did the Khmer Rouge perceive targeting ethnic and religious groups as qualitatively distinct 
from targeting social classes? Equally, the perspective of the victims must be considered. It is 
unlikely that Cambodians perceived these different groups targeted by the Khmer Rouge as 
subject to different persecutory campaigns. Memoirs from survivors certainly do not make such 
a differentiation. [17] Are we then imposing a Western, even Orientalist interpretation upon 
these events? Indeed, one could suggest that the entire attempt to understand the atrocities of the 
Khmer Rouge through a categorisation according to Western labels is of little relevance to 
Cambodians.
Using the UN definition of genocide also influences not only how, but which parts of this 
history are written. The quest to establish minorities within Cambodia as victims of genocide, 
has perhaps led to an inordinate focus on the particular experiences of these groups. 
Considerably more research appears to have been conducted into those groups whose 
experiences may 'qualify' as genocidal. This has resulted in a body of scholarship which has not 
focused sufficiently on the experiences of all of Cambodian society. Furthermore, a number of 
scholars have charged that authors such as Kiernan, in their efforts to declare the Cambodian 
experience 'genocide', have focused on the racial nature of the killing to the exclusion of the 
influence of class, education, or political beliefs.[18] This may result in a skewed understanding 
of the reasons victims were targeted under the Pol Pot regime.
The alternative approach to writing the history of the Cambodian genocide is to use a different 
definition of the word 'genocide'. Serge Thion, in an article entitled 'Genocide as a Political 
Commodity', argues strongly that this would lead to a more accurate conception of the genocide. 
Thion argues that "generally speaking, people were persecuted under the DK [Democratic 
Kampuchea] regime because of what they believed, or were supposed by security organs to 
believe, and because of family links with those suspected of harbouring wrong beliefs or 
thoughts detrimental to the state".[19] Furthermore, he reminds us that the greatest part of the 
human losses must be ascribed to the economic policy of the Khmer Rouge. According to 
Thion, the use of the UN definition of genocide in describing the atrocities in Cambodia leads to 
a particularly partisan, political interpretation of events, and one with which the Cambodians 
themselves would not identify. An alternative approach would allow a more inclusive history of 
the Killing Fields of Cambodia to be written. Victims of the Khmer Rouge were targeted for a 
number of reasons, and each of these reasons, and their combination, must be explored fully. A 
definition of genocide that facilitates such exploration will lead to a better understanding of 
events than one that restricts it.
Nevertheless, there may be some negative consequences to divorcing the history of the 
Cambodian atrocities from the UN legal definition of genocide. Since the time of the Killing 
Fields, efforts to bring the Khmer Rouge leadership to justice have been slow and inadequate. In 
this time, historical scholarship on the atrocities has been a strong source of pressure calling for 
the punishment of the crime of genocide under the Genocide Convention. Removing this 
pressure would not only decrease the focus on an appropriate response to this heinous crime, but 
may also influence the perception of public pressure in responding to future genocides.
Defining History: Indigenous-Settler Relations in Australia
The definition of genocide has also been of great significance to the discussion around the 
Stolen Generations in Australia in recent times.[20] The 'Stolen Generations' is a term that refers 
to the victims of Australia's former policy of forcibly removing Aboriginal children from their 
families and communities.[21] This was a systematic policy of State, Territory and Federal 
governments, with the aim of assimilating Aboriginal children into Anglo-Australian culture. 
Children, at a very young age, were routinely removed from their parents, and placed in 
institutions, or fostered or adopted into white families. Parents were disallowed contact with 
their children, and in most cases had no legal recourse.[22] This policy spanned 150 years of 
Australia's history, and was pursued until the late 1960s. The proportion of Aboriginal children 
subjected to removal is estimated at between one in three and one in ten. The consequences of 
this policy to Indigenous Australians have included broken families, loss of language, culture 
and connection to traditional lands, fractured communities and a negative impact on physical 
and mental health. [23] The term 'Stolen Generations', first used by Australian historian Peter 
Read, reflects not only the forcible nature of the removal, but some of the anguish that resulted 
from this policy.[24] 
In 1997, Bringing them Home: Report of the National Inquiry into the Separation of Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islander Children from their Families, examined the issue of genocide and the 
Stolen Generations. Using the UN definition of genocide, the report concluded that the events 
under question did, in fact, constitute genocide. In light of this conclusion, it is perhaps 
surprising that 'genocide' is a word used rarely, and only very recently, in describing the history 
of Indigenous Australian and non-Indigenous Australian relations. As Colin Tatz describes so 
aptly, "Almost all historians of the Aboriginal experience - black and white - avoid it. They 
write about pacifying, killing, cleansing, excluding, exterminating, starving, poisoning, 
shooting, beheading, sterilising, exiling, removing - but avoid genocide".[25] Perhaps one 
explanation for the reluctance to use the term 'genocide' in describing indigenous-Settler 
relations can be traced back to the nature of the UN definition. In this legal definition, genocide 
is described as one or more of a number of acts. This effectively equates the act of "Killing 
members of the group" with "Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group", an 
equation which invites direct comparison of events as disparate as the experiences of the Stolen 
Generations with those of the Jews in Nazi Germany. [26] Few historians are comfortable with 
this type of analysis. [27]
However it is understandable that even historians who give little import to such concerns may 
hesitate to use the word 'genocide' in describing the experiences of the Stolen Generations. It is 
extraordinary to suggest that while the experiences of the Stolen Generations are considered 
genocide under the UN definition, the decimation of ninety per cent of Indigenous Australians 
between 1788 and 1900, may not 'qualify'. [28] As Tony Barta elucidates in 'Relations of 
Genocide: Land and Lives in the Colonisation of Australia', "It [the term genocide] has 
succeeded in devaluing all other concepts of less planned destruction, even if the effects are the 
same. To be really terrible, an ordeal inflicted on a people now has to be 'genocidal'". Barta 
believes "If they [historians] have not spoken of genocide - the word appears very rarely - it is 
for reasons of definition which have made the concept inadequate in a case crying out for its 
use".[29] One can understand the historian's reluctance to use the term genocide in describing 
the experience of the Stolen Generations if in doing so there may be an implicit devaluation of 
the earlier decimation of the Indigenous Australian population.
Nevertheless, the historian must consider the ramifications of excluding the term 'genocide' 
from such discourse. Such an omission may serve to devalue the experiences of the Stolen 
Generations, particularly given the conclusions presented in Bringing Them Home. Admittedly, 
thus far there have been fairly negative political consequences to this classification of the Stolen 
Generations. The political response has been to reject and discount this conclusion, and use this 
polemic to avoid seriously considering a plethora of related historical and Indigenous issues. 
Indeed, the role of this political response in influencing the use or omission of the term 
'genocide' from discussion surrounding the Stolen Generations can be a powerful force itself.
[30] However, as the political discussion on this issue continues, and particularly as it 
encompasses issues of a possible treaty and reparations, it may become a far more useful 
category for conceptualising the history of the Stolen Generations. Historians working in this 
area must consider not only immediate but more long term consequences of their history.
A small number of scholars have chosen to use the term 'genocide' in their discussion of Settler-
Indigenous relations in Australia. Colin Tatz has analysed the Indigenous Australian experience 
in light of the UN definition of genocide. He believes Australia may be guilty of multiple acts of 
genocide:
Australia is guilty of at least three ... acts of genocide: first, the essentially private 
genocide, the physical killing committed by settlers and rogue police officers in the 
nineteenth century, while the state, in the form of the colonial authorities, stood 
silently by (for the most part);second, the twentieth century official state policy and 
practice of forcibly transferring children from one group to another with the express 
intention that they cease being Aboriginal; third, the twentieth century attempts to 
achieve the biological disappearance of those deemed 'half-caste' Aborigines.[31] 
Tatz highlights that not only genocide, but also "complicity in genocide", is punishable under 
the Articles of the Genocide Convention - a provision almost invariably overlooked.[32] 
Furthermore, he also explores a very interesting issue surrounding the definitional problems 
associated with the requirement of "intent to destroy, in whole or in part" in the UN definition.
[33] The definition does not rule out, either implicitly or explicitly, intent with bona fides, good 
faith, "for their own good". It may therefore be possible to conclude that the ultimate purpose of 
the crime is irrelevant, as long as intentional destruction of a protected group takes place.
There is also a recognisable trend towards using an alternative definition of genocide when 
using this term to describe Settler-Indigenous relations. Tony Barta argues strongly for a 
different definition of genocide to that provided by the UN. Barta believes that it would be more 
useful to develop a conception of genocide which focuses upon relations of destruction, and 
without the current emphasis on the policies and intentions which brought it in to being.[34] 
Alison Palmer argues that nineteenth century Queensland witnessed a distinctive form of 
genocide between 1840 and 1897. While she believes "The structure and resources of the 
Queensland government were so limited during this period that any plan to systematically 
annihilate the Aborigines would have failed", this does not prevent her from referring to the 
events in Colonial Queensland as a case of genocide.[35] However, intent to destroy a group is 
required by the UN definition for an atrocity to be considered genocide. Palmer justifies her 
choice of terminology with the contention that it is only through examining colonial genocides, 
atrocities which mostly do not fit the narrow UN definition, that we can develop a richer 
definition of genocide and a clearer understanding of genocides more generally. [36]
Clearly, there are very significant potential consequences associated with the choice of 
terminology by the scholar in the field of Settler-Indigenous relations. The use of the UN 
definition of genocide has the advantage of keeping the issue firmly on the Australian political 
agenda. However, an alternative definition of genocide, without the restrictions of the UN 
definition, may lead to a more comprehensive history of the Indigenous experience of 
dispossession, murder and removal in the last two centuries.
Conclusion
Defining genocide has been a contentious task for historians. The ongoing and often passionate 
debate surrounding the most appropriate definition is a reflection of its power to influence and 
shape the resulting scholarship. Indeed, we have seen how differing conceptions of genocide 
have led historians of both the Cambodian and Australian genocides to focus on very different 
facets and interpretations of events. While some of these have been complementary, for others 
the interpretation differs so widely as to be highly conflicting. In light of these findings, the 
important question to be considered is 'Which definition leads to better history?' That is, which 
definition most facilitates a fuller recording of events, and a broader understanding of the 
meaning of these events?
I believe the answer lies in a more inclusive definition of genocide. Few would argue with the 
proposition that genocide is a complex, extreme event. Yet most definitions are relatively 
narrow, asserting a small number of descriptors as fundamental for an atrocity to be 'genocide', 
and then insisting that all such criteria must be met for the event to 'qualify'. This focus diverts 
the scholar's attention from developing a comprehensive examination of genocide. In addition, 
events that appear to be of a similar nature, but do not meet these rigorous criteria, are excluded 
from our understanding of genocide. A more inclusive definition would encourage more 
comprehensive explorations of genocidal events, as scholars seek to discover the range of 
mechanisms involved in particular occurrences. Furthermore, the inclusion of atrocities not 
currently reckoned as genocide would increase our understanding of the phenomenon more 
generally, leading to a richer concept of genocide.
A more inclusive conception might accept only one or two criteria as essential for a definition of 
genocide, such as a targeted victim group and some type of genocidal process. Other facets of 
the crime, such as perpetrator intent, the role of the State and so forth could be recognised as 
likely to play a role, but not essential. As noted earlier, Chalk and Jonassohn's definition of 
genocide, as "a form of one-sided mass killing in which a state or other authority intends to 
destroy a group, as that group and membership in it are defined by the perpetrator"[37] is a good 
example of an alternative conception of genocide. However, it requires that perpetrator intent be 
provable. A broader definition might read "A form of one-sided mass killing in which a state 
and/or other authority/ies target a specific victim group, as that group and membership in it are 
defined by the perpetrator". This would allow the inclusion of atrocities in which perpetrator 
intent is problematic, or in which perpetrators only partially fulfilled their genocidal aims. It 
would also encompass instances where the organisation of genocidal acts was decentralised. 
Such a definition would include, for example, colonial settlers killing Indigenous inhabitants, 
while colonial authorities ignored or were complicit in the killings. Israel Charny, a noted 
Holocaust scholar, extends this argument still further. Charny believes that all mass killing 
should be regarded as genocide, with cases being classified in different subgroups according to 
their characteristics.[38] 
The definition proposed above limits our understanding of genocide to instances of mass killing. 
However, there are other types of destruction of a group that may also be considered genocide. 
Indeed, the UN definition acknowledges that causing serious harm to members of a group, 
imposing measures intended to prevent births within a group and forcible transfer of children of 
a group to another group may all be considered genocidal acts.[39] To encompass acts such as 
these, where clearly the aim is one of destroying a victim group but where mass killing may not 
be involved, I believe a broader definition is required. I suggest the following definition may be 
most appropriate". Genocide is a one-sided attempt by a state or other authority/ies to destroy a 
specific victim group, as that group and membership in it are defined by the perpetrator". I 
believe the goal of the destruction of a victim group lies at the core of our understanding of 
genocide; the means of destruction, whether they be mass killing or forced assimilation, are 
designed to meet this goal. Therefore I believe that a definition that focuses upon this 
fundamental aspect of genocide, and does not preclude from consideration any atrocities in 
which this aspect is present, will lead to the most comprehensive understanding of genocide.
We have also seen the influence that genocide scholarship can have on contemporary events, 
and how significant that impact can be. I believe that the responsible historian must always be 
mindful of these potential consequences. While the Genocide Convention remains in effect, 
there is a strong argument for considering atrocities also in light of the UN definition of 
genocide. Only thus can the perpetrators of genocide be held responsible for their actions under 
international law. An examination of an event utilising both the UN definition and a more 
inclusive definition may be ideal in this circumstance, resulting in a comprehensive history and 
ensuring there will not be negative contemporary consequences.
Ultimately, however, I believe that a more inclusive definition of genocide will result in a 
scholarship with the most positive future ramifications. Scholars, activists and even 
governments that address the question of preventing genocide rely on a comprehensive 
understanding of the nature of the crime to do so; historians and other scholars provide the bulk 
of this information. An historical scholarship that can provide a comprehensive, balanced 
understanding of the crime of genocide will provide the basis upon which the most effective 
preventative measures can be implemented.
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